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“All the ancient histories, as one of our wits say, are just fables that have been 
agreed upon.” 
 —Voltaire
Commentary
SOME “WHAT IF” THOUGHTS: Notes on Donoghue v 
Stevenson
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL702
DONOGHUE V STEVENSON IS so well known that its facts and judgment need little 
further rehearsal or rendition.1 Indeed, the case and its aftermath are some of the 
most documented in the long common law tradition. Many treat Donoghue as if 
it were the greatest of all “great cases.”2 That being said, a vibrant debate about the 
precise meaning and ambit of its legacy still continues, especially regarding the 
putative leading judgment of Lord Atkin and its influence on the development of 
the common law of tort. Indeed, part of Donoghue’s greatness is considered to be 
its almost Delphic sweep and interpretive elusiveness; its importance is matched 
by and reinforced by its indistinctness. However, there is a tendency to approach 
the case as if its origin and later pre-eminence were somehow preordained—that 
it was always destined to be great and that it exerted its huge influence by dint of 
its irresistible rationale and inevitable effect. 
Yet this assessment seems to depend on a very crude depiction of both the 
evolution of the common law and social history generally. The assumption seems 
to be that law is a rational exercise that is largely set apart from social history and 
that both law and social history unfold in a reasonably orderly, if unconnected, 
manner. This Whiggish sense of inevitability to the path of both law and social 
history is mistaken and misleading. Far from being a prime example of law 
and history’s methodical and almost inexorable operation and development, 
Donoghue is better understood as an occasion on which one can glimpse law and 
history’s organic and catch-as-catch-can quality. In short, Donoghue is a great 
case that illustrates the contingent nature of law, greatness, and history. Despite 
appearances to the contrary, Donoghue (and Lord Atkin’s judgment in particular) 
is not tantamount to a jurisprudential sermon on the mount that wields its 
influence and authority by that fact alone.
In this commentary, I look at Donoghue and its legacy through the lens of 
a different and speculative kind of inquiry. I seek to isolate what was and was 
not important about Donoghue in exploring the development and dynamics 
of legal change; the focus is upon asking what if the case had not unfolded in 
precisely the way that it did and what if there had been some slight changes 
in the surrounding circumstances and the dramatis personae. This may seem a 
rather obscure and elliptical approach to the case and the common law. However, 
this way of proceeding might allow a more critical and less trite analysis of how 
cases achieve greatness and how the developmental process of the common law 
works. Indeed, answering these “what if ” questions demands confronting, if not 
resolving, some very big questions about law, law and society, and their change.
1. [1932] AC 562, 101 LJPC 119 [Donoghue cited to AC].
2. For my own account, see Allan C Hutchinson, Is Eating People Wrong? Great Legal Cases and 
How They Shaped the World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) ch 6.
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I. REIMAGINING HISTORY
Alternate or counterfactual history exists somewhere in that shadowy intellectual 
zone between the more familiar and traditional domains of fact and fiction. In 
attempting to explore a number of “what if ” situations, this intellectual approach 
takes an authentic or agreed-upon point in history, posits some slightly different 
factual assumptions, and then spins out an alternate or competing narrative 
account of how events might have worked out differently (or not). While this 
approach can be utilized as an entirely fictional and imaginative endeavour,3 
it can also be used to serve more strict and rigorous historiographical ends. 
The latter is achieved by isolating certain events or focusing on the role of a 
particular person in the traditional historical account, imaging that that event 
had not happened or that person had not existed or had acted differently, and 
then seeking to evaluate whether history might or might not have unfolded 
differently. In this way, the relative importance of any particular event or person 
can be better measured or adjudged.4 As such, this disputed mode of historio-
graphical analysis can contribute to more nuanced and informed accounts of 
history. Imaginative reconstruction can be combined with factual reporting to 
offer a more revealing and suggestive account of history. In particular, it can be 
deployed to help isolate what might be central and what might be peripheral to 
the unfolding and explanation of specific events that did occur.
For example, a continuing debate in history and related disciplines is over 
the extent to which certain historical figures were essential to the historical record 
and dynamic of the twentieth century: Would there have been a Holocaust if 
Hitler had not existed? Would apartheid have been swept aside in South Africa 
without the leadership of Nelson Mandela? Or would India’s independence have 
occurred differently if Mahatma Gandhi had not been around? In sum, what if 
these characters had each fallen victim to some childhood illness or accident that 
had ended their lives? Would history have turned out fundamentally differently? 
Or, to put it another way, what if these figures had existed, but at a different place 
and time? Would their impact have been as significant or even noticed? While 
these questions obviously do not have definitive answers, a serious consideration 
of them does oblige a critical reassessment of certain accepted truths.
3. For two famous examples of alternative history in literature, see Vladimir Nabokov, Ada or 
Ardor: A Family Chronicle (Toronto: McGraw-Hill International, 1969); Philip Roth, The 
Plot Against America (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004).
4. See e.g. Niall Ferguson, ed, Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals, revised ed (New 
York: Basic Books, 1999); Martin Bunzl, “Counterfactual History: A User’s Guide” (2004) 
109:3 Am Hist Rev 845.
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More broadly understood, these “what if ” questions raise the historiograph-
ical chestnut of the relation between individual agency and broader social forces 
in their shaping of history. Any answer to the stated questions will both depend 
on and illuminate what is thought to be the balance between human personality 
and social circumstance. By positing an alternative history in which these people 
did not exist or acted very differently, it becomes possible to provide a more 
subtle, if indeterminate, assessment of the respective roles that personality and 
social dynamics played. While it seems reasonable to concede that events may 
not have happened in exactly the same way without these individuals, it seems 
a stretch to suggest that the larger historical pattern and outcomes would have 
been vastly different: Nazi Germany was not only about Hitler; South African 
apartheid was wobbling anyway; and India, like other colonies, would likely 
have achieved independence at some similar point in time. Yet, this assessment 
may itself reveal certain contested assumptions and propositions about historical 
development and change. Accordingly, it is important to remain open to the 
broader historiographical debate in offering more focused accounts of particular 
historical events.
That said, what are the uses and consequences of applying this alternative or 
counterfactual thinking to Donoghue? What can such an approach do to provide 
new or telling insights into the case, the common law, and the relationship 
between law and society? Of course, the nature of this jurisprudential inquiry is 
unavoidably conjectural and inconclusive. Nevertheless, by isolating a series of 
occurrences and the roles of particular people, this inquiry might uncover some 
suggestive and hidden insights into how law develops and how law and society 
interact over time. Accordingly, the ambition of this commentary is not to offer 
definitive or grand answers to some perennial questions of jurisprudence. Instead, 
its more modest goal is to shed some light on one episode in the contingent 
and experimental drama of the common law.5 It will be for others to determine 
the cogency and suggestiveness of my provocations for a broader account of the 
common law’s changing doctrines.
II. BEER AND SNAILS
A first question to ask any theorist of the common law might be: Would the history 
of tort law have been significantly different if May Donoghue had not gone to 
the Wellmeadow Café on that summery August evening? Of course, this would 
5. For more on a broader understanding of the common law and society, see Allan C 
Hutchinson, Evolution and the Common Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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mean that Donoghue would not have entered the law reports. So, to that extent, at 
least, the history of tort law would be different. However, it does not follow that 
the history of tort law would be different in some fundamental or substantive 
way—whoever drank that fateful bottle of ginger beer might well have initiated 
similar litigation, or Donoghue or another person might have consumed some 
other noxious substance in similar circumstances on a different date. To address 
and unpack these particular queries, it is necessary to move quickly to some 
deep and contestable issues about how law changes and takes shape and how the 
relationship between legal doctrine and social conditions is understood. While 
it is hard to conclude that a general tort of negligence would not have seen the 
doctrinal light of day if Donoghue had not gone to the Wellmeadow Café, it is 
also unconvincing to imagine that everything would have nonetheless unfolded 
in much the same way.6
The next task is to distinguish between those events and personalities that 
might have had some alternative effect on the law’s development and those that 
might not have had such an effect. For instance, while the non-involvement of 
Lord Atkin or Walter Leachman (Donoghue’s lawyer) might well have had a 
significant impact on what occurred and followed, it is much more difficult to 
speculate that the non-involvement of Lord Tomlin or Wilfrid Normand (David 
Stevenson’s appellate counsel) would have had a significant effect. However, 
even this distinction is open to challenge and can be seen to depend upon larger 
assumptions about the dynamics of historical change. Was it important that 
Donoghue went to the Wellmeadow Café as opposed to another establishment? 
That she had a ginger beer as opposed to another beverage? That her friend paid for 
the drink and not her? All these elements will take on particular significance and 
resonance depending on what a commentator’s historiographical commitments 
are about the progress of law, society, and history.
So, for the sake of argument, it might be assumed that the involvement of Lord 
Atkin and Leachman was significant for both the Donoghue litigation itself and 
its subsequent elevation to a “great case.” From an alternative history perspective, 
6. Of course, there is an analogue to all this in so-called chaos theory in which the butterfly 
effect is given pride of place (i.e., in deterministic non-linear contexts, large systems are 
sensitive to changes in their initial conditions such that a very tiny change in one place can 
bring about vast changes throughout the systems). See Edward N Lorenz, “Predictability: 
Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?” (Address 
delivered at the 139th Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
Washington, DC, 29 December 1972), [unpublished], online: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences <http://eaps4.mit.edu/research/
Lorenz/Butterfly_1972.pdf>.
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the key issue would be not only whether this involvement was significant, but 
also how significant it was: What if Leachman had not championed Donoghue’s 
plight? What if there had been a different bench of law lords? What if Lord 
Buckmaster’s pinched judgment had won out over Lord Atkin’s more expansive 
effort? Or, what if later judges and lawyers had taken more of a shine to Lord 
Macmillan’s judgment than Lord Atkin’s? As focused as these questions might be, 
they do offer a keyhole glimpse into the wider world of jurisprudential debate 
about how the common law changes—what is the nature of the relationship 
between the common law’s development and changing social dynamics?
Almost all legal scholars maintain that the substance and development of 
law are relatively autonomous (i.e., they are neither entirely beholden to nor 
completely independent of socio-economic forces). However, this proposition is 
so trite and capacious as to be almost meaningless. There is a world of difference 
between a stance that maintains that law is primarily separate from society but 
is partly determined by it, and one that insists that law is primarily determined 
by society but is partly separate from it. So, while it might well be that law 
has some relative autonomy from its larger social and historical context, the 
more compelling questions are about how relative and how autonomous it 
is. Accordingly, it is incumbent on legal scholars to give some substance and 
specificity to the claim about law’s relative autonomy. A “what if ” approach is one 
way to contribute to that jurisprudential task.
The challenge, of course, is to determine why Donoghue did take place and 
unfold as it did as much as why it might not have done so. There had to be a 
certain confluence of forces and findings in place for the considerable shift to 
a tort of negligence to occur at all.7 Unless one is a dyed-in-the-wool legalist, 
it beggars belief to imagine that negligence’s introduction and acceptance 
was simply a matter of internal and intellectual engagement within the legal 
community; there were definite political leanings and social values in place that 
made the creation of a tort of negligence more likely than not or, at least, that 
made its creation less than unacceptable to the judicial profession. As Lord Esher 
had stated almost fifty years earlier, “[A]ny proposition the result of which would 
be to show that the Common Law of England is wholly unreasonable and unjust, 
cannot be part of the Common Law of England.”8 Moreover, Donoghue is an 
extension of a principle that Justice Benjamin Cardozo articulated in 1916 in 
the American case of MacPherson v Buick Motor Co,9 to which the judges in 
7. See Robert L Rabin, “The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation” 
(1981) 15:4 Ga L Rev 925.
8. Emmens v Pottle (1885), 16 QBD 354 at 357-58, 50 JP 228.
9. 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (App Ct 1916) [MacPherson].
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Donoghue referred.10 This might lead to the conclusion that, even if Donoghue 
had not seen the doctrinal light of day, the courts would have found another 
occasion on which to develop the intellectual roots of negligence and to tap into 
the prevailing milieu around what is “reasonable” and “just.”
It also bears noting that, contrary to common understanding, Donoghue 
did not release tort liability for negligence onto an unsuspecting legal world. 
While contract was the primary mode of civil obligation in the 1930s, there 
existed a patchwork quilt of statutory and judicial schemes of tort liability 
that imposed on actors a range of duties to take care. While Donoghue extended 
negligence liability to some new areas and grounded tort liability where none 
had existed previously, it also reduced liability in other old areas from its 
existing strictness to a more negligence-focused liability. As is so often the case 
with the common law, two steps forward was accompanied by one step back; the 
path of the common law is not the unidirectional or straightforward one that 
many envision or wish for.
III. LORDLY MATTERS
Even if Lord Atkin had not sat on the Donoghue bench (or Lord Tomlin had sided 
with Lord Buckmaster), the tort of negligence might well have emerged, albeit 
not in the majestic form of the “neighbour” principle. In his supporting judgment 
(and what is considered the swing vote), the recently appointed Lord Macmillan 
refused to go as far as Lord Atkin in extending liability to all negligent actors; he 
confined himself to the manufacturer-consumer relationship in his imposition 
of negligence liability aside from contract. However, as well as finding against 
Stevenson on the basis of negligence, he did throw down the doctrinal gauntlet 
to later generations of judges and jurists by declaring that “[t]he categories of 
negligence are never closed.”11 Similarly, Lord Thankerton was more tentative 
than Lord Atkin, but hinted strongly at the possibility that a duty of care might 
exist more generally even if it is “impossible … to catalogue finally, amid the 
ever varying types of human relationships, those relationships in which a duty to 
exercise care arises apart from contract… .”12 Indeed, Lord Macmillan and Lord 
Thankerton’s less daring and more step-by-step approach might well have been 
more in line with the traditional incrementalist spirit of the common law.
10. See Donoghue, supra note 1 at 577.
11. Ibid at 619.
12. Ibid at 603.
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Also, it was surely not the rhetorical potency of Lord Atkin’s bold judgment 
alone that carried the day and made Donoghue into a great case. For Donoghue 
to rise to its historic status, there had to be a few generations of judges and 
jurists (and, of course, society at large) who bought into the idea and practice 
of an expanding principle of negligence liability. Although the reaction to the 
law lords’ decision in Donoghue was predictably mixed, there was more support 
than criticism. Among the legal community, it was celebrated as a necessary step 
forward in negligence law and as a decision that brought the law more in line 
with contemporary sensibilities. The eminent Sir Frederick Pollock praised the 
“Scots Lords,” including Lord Atkin, in the Law Quarterly Review for “overriding 
the scruples of English colleagues who could not emancipate themselves from 
the pressure of a supposed current of authority in English Courts.”13 Insofar as 
the decision pierced public consciousness, there was warm approval. Whereas 
the newspaper The Scotsman wrote that the decision “should be welcomed by 
the public,”14 the Law Times said that the decision was “revolutionary” and 
represented a “radical change” in tort law that was “strictly in accord with the 
needs of modern economic times.”15
The staying power of Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle can be attributed to 
an organic combination of its intellectual appeal and its socio-political accept-
ability. Although the House of Lords wavered in its commitment to a principled 
articulation of tort law, it often sought to satisfy Lord Atkin’s aspiration to 
identify “some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of 
which the particular cases found in the books are but instances.”16 Most boldly, 
in Anns v Merton London Borough Council in 1977, Lord Wilberforce declared 
that it was no longer necessary to proceed on a case-by-case basis.17 Instead, he 
said courts should ask “whether … there is a sufficient relationship of proximity 
or neighbourhood” between the harmed plaintiff and the negligent defendant.18 
If so, a prima facie duty of care is established unless “there are any considerations 
which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty… .”19 And, 
as late as 1990 in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman, the House of Lords revised Lord 
Atkin’s neighbour principle to encompass public policy concerns such that, even 
13. “The Snail in the Bottle, and Thereafter” (1933) 49:1 Law Q Rev 22 at 22.
14. (27 May 1932), cited in Allan C Hutchinson, Laughing at the Gods: Great Judges and How 
They Made the Common Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 124.
15. (1932) 173 LT 411, cited in ibid.
16. Donoghue, supra note 1 at 580.
17. (1977), [1978] AC 728, [1977] 2 All ER 118 [cited to AC].
18. Ibid at 751.
19. Ibid at 752 [citations omitted].
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if foreseeability and proximity or neighbourhood are found to be present, a duty 
of care will only arise when it is “fair, just and reasonable that the law should 
impose a duty of a given scope upon the one party for the benefit of the other.”20
Furthermore, even if we assume, contrary to fact, that Lord Atkin’s judgment 
did not prevail over Lord Buckmaster’s narrower and more skeptical judgment, it 
is by no means certain that a tort of negligence would not have become part of the 
law. Lord Buckmaster’s opinion may have galvanized opposition and given life 
to a political momentum to establish an even more expansive tort of negligence 
or even strict liability. Indeed, it has to be remembered that Lord Buckmaster, 
who had been a relatively progressive and experienced Liberal politician in the 
1920s and 1930s, was as concerned with corralling the activist role of courts 
in a democracy as he was with stymieing the creation of the substantive tort of 
negligence itself. Against the political and social context of the time (in which the 
welfare state was midwifed), it is hard to resist the conclusion that the government 
might well have introduced some form of legislation to do exactly what Lord 
Atkin’s opinion did for negligence liability in the common law.
Accordingly, asking questions from a counterfactual or alternate history can 
help to illuminate or, at least, hint at those historical circumstances and person-
alities that were likely more required than not for a Donoghue-like principle 
to become part of the common law. There is nothing scientific or determina-
tive about such an approach, but it does enable a more critical perspective that 
avoids a knee-jerk Panglossian response to each and every twist and turn of legal 
doctrine. The common law is constantly moving, but never arriving anywhere in 
particular.
IV. BROADER CONSIDERATIONS
One way to approach the issue of what is and is not important in determining 
the role of Donoghue and its component parts in the development of negligence 
liability is to gather together all of the case’s pertinent and contextual features and 
then ask which ones are essential to the development of a tort of negligence and 
which are not. On such a basis, while it is clear that some small changes would 
undercut the importance and even existence of Donoghue as a landmark case, 
it is less obvious which changes would be sufficient to prevent completely the 
establishment of a tort of negligence. In other words, while some small changes 
in character and circumstances might effectively nullify the impact of Donoghue 
20. [1990] 2 AC 605 at 618, [1990] 1 All ER 568, Bridge of Harwich LJ.
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itself and its doctrinal template, it would require much more substantial changes 
to prevent entirely the introduction of negligence liability into English law over 
the following decades. So, for instance, although Lord Atkin’s presence or absence 
in the case might prove to be important in mapping out exactly how the law 
would have developed without his neighbour principle, it is far from conclusive 
that a similar tort of negligence would not have seen the light of day.
It is a considerable analytical stretch to insist that Lord Atkin’s involvement 
alone was pivotal to the development of negligence liability in English law and 
that, without him, there would have been no tort of negligence. After all, the tort 
of negligence did take hold in American law around the same time as Donoghue.21 
At the risk of sounding silly, it is apparent that Lord Atkin played no role in such 
an occurrence; the case occurred in another jurisdiction and several years before 
Donoghue. This strongly suggests that it was less the particular characters and 
circumstances of Donoghue that drove English law’s evolution towards negligence 
and more the social dynamics in play that propelled it towards negligence law. 
In short, the time was right and, if it had not been Lord Atkin, it might well 
have been someone else who seized the doctrinal day and laid down a test for 
duty or proximate cause. Of course, this argument raises the obvious difficulty 
of explaining why English law did not later take a similar turn to American legal 
doctrine in the 1960s. The California case of Greenman v Yuba Power Products 
in 1963 ushered in the doctrine of strict liability that soon took hold across the 
United States and replaced much of the jurisprudence on negligence.22 
Efforts to elucidate the divergence of legal doctrine between England’s 
continuing adherence to negligence liability, especially for products liability, 
and the United States’ move towards strict liability might take a number of 
routes. Two main ones come to mind: first, that different regimes of legislative 
protection were enacted for consumers in the two jurisdictions (i.e., the English 
political landscape allowed for more consumer-friendly legislative interventions 
than the American political landscape); and second, that the practical application 
and judicial exception making that occurred rendered the apparently different 
legal doctrines more similar than different (i.e., the American legal doctrine is 
less strict in operation and the English doctrine is more exacting than might be 
initially appreciated).23 That said, there might well be a host of other explana-
21. MacPherson, supra note 9.
22. Greenman v Yuba Power Products, 59 Cal 2d 57, 27 Cal Rptr 697 (Sup Ct).
23. In Donoghue itself, Lord Macmillan was mindful to emphasize that he “rather regard[s] this 
type of case as a special instance of negligence where the law exacts a degree of diligence so 
stringent as to amount practically to a guarantee of safety.” Supra note 1 at 611-12.
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tions that pass historiographical muster. Again, it bears emphasizing that there is 
no theoretical formula or generalizable account that will work in all instances to 
explain historical development or what is needed to reach the tipping point for 
significant social or legal change. 
Nevertheless, it does seem possible to draw some general observations 
about the role of Donoghue and its context in the history of negligence liability. 
The challenge is to do so without making extravagant claims about the overall 
evolution of legal doctrine across the jurisprudential board. Both society in 
general and law in particular are far too messy in their patterns and practices to be 
reducible to neat equations of cause and effect. The historical interaction between 
one feature of society and another cannot be described or formulated once and 
for all: “[T]he system as a whole has no single ideological imprint.”24 The fact is 
that not only does law fail to conform to any internal or external deep logic, but 
also the specific relation between external forces and internal rationality resists 
generalization; no one account of that relation is valid for all time and all places. 
The development of the common law is neither serendipitous nor scientific. As 
such, the relationship between law’s development and changing social relations 
is more complicated and indeterminate than is usually allowed or conceded; it 
defies simple or consistent elucidation. Nonetheless, this does not preclude a 
profitable analytical account of one episode in the common law’s development. 
While the history of English tort law might have unfolded differently if 
Donoghue had not walked into the Wellmeadow Café, if Leachman had not 
been on a mission to skewer Paisley’s ginger beer manufacturers, or if Lord 
Atkin had not been on the bench that day, it would not be so different a history 
looked at from today’s standpoint more than eighty years later. The path travelled 
may have been slightly different in timing and terrain, but the overall direction 
and destination would surely have been much the same. Is it really feasible to 
maintain that without these three personalities, the whole of negligence law 
would be entirely and meaningfully different? 
None of this is to say that the involvement of Donoghue, Leachman, or 
Lord Atkin was not important. It was. They had a continuing impact on the fine 
texture and local development of the law. But the impact of particular individuals 
must be measured and assessed in light of the pervasive social and historical 
forces in play in 1932 and soon after. To prioritize individual personalities over 
24. Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication: fin de siècle (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1997) at 225-26. For a more fully developed account of this insight, see Allan C 
Hutchinson, It’s All in the Game: A Nonfoundationalist Account of Law and Adjudication 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2000) at 216-51.
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social forces (and vice versa) as a general matter of historiographical principle is 
mistaken; each interacts with and influences the other. On another day and in 
another case, their involvement might well have been decisive. Accordingly, it can 
be concluded tentatively that the precise interaction of the general social forces 
in play and the particular situational dynamics in law can unfold very differently 
from one context to another. Donoghue is simply one chapter, albeit a significant 
one, in the evolution of the common law. The doctrinal story and plot of the 
common law might have experienced a significant twist as a result of Donoghue’s 
occurrence or non-occurrence. Whether the law’s tale would have turned out 
entirely differently over time seems possible, but unlikely.
V. CONCLUSION
As I was completing this short commentary, it was the fiftieth anniversary of John 
F. Kennedy’s assassination. There was much talk about how things in the United 
States and the world might have happened differently if he had not died in Dallas 
in late November 1963. Would Vietnam have happened? Would the Cold War 
have played out differently? Would the push for civil rights have been stronger? 
And would Kennedy himself have become and remained the iconic figure that he 
is now perceived to be?25 These are each fascinating and unanswerable “what if ” 
questions. But their posing and the ensuing efforts to answer them do offer an 
occasion to muse on larger questions of historical judgment and historiographical 
insight. Kennedy was a “great man” by most standards. Yet, extant social and 
political forces of his presidency and its aftermath shaped, at least in some part, 
his contemporary status and later influence. In the same way that Kennedy and 
his legacy are inseparable from his and our times, so also is Donoghue. To attempt 
to detach the force of personality from the impact of larger currents is folly; to 
attempt to develop a grand account of how they work to constitute and reconsti-
tute each other is also foolhardy.
25. See e.g. Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown 
and Company, 2003); Robert Dallek, Camelot’s Court: Inside the Kennedy White House (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2013).
